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INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: A
MODERN APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "prejudgment interest" denotes the interest on a judgment
computed from the time of the actual injury to the date of the final judg-
ment." It is interest2 on a sum of money which, until the rendering of final
judgment, has not been declared to be damages for the plaintiff. Prejudg-
ment interest is not punitive.3 It is better viewed as compensatory in na-
ture because its purpose is to indemnify a claimant for the loss. of the
money which presumably could have been earned had payment of dam-
ages not been delayed.4 Once a cause of action accrues, the injured party
becomes entitled to be made whole.5 Prejudgment interest may be viewed
as an essential element of fair and just compensation.
6
The Christian components of the medieval world viewed interest as an
evil and oppressive device of the rich.7 This attitude has long since disap-
peared from modern commercial life; however, it is still reflected in the
reluctance of some courts to award prejudgment interest as a matter of
course. Legal scholars gradually began to realize that money has a "use
value," and interest, reflecting this "use" by the defendant, is a legitimate
element in providing a plaintiff with full compensation. Courts have
demonstrated an increasing willingness to award prejudgment interest in
recent times; however, a substantial degree of conflict remains in the deci-
sions. This conflict, combined with the influence and diversity of local
statutes and cases, makes it virtually impossible to state any single rule or
set of rules regarding the award of prejudgment interest. However,
through an analysis of historical and modern court decisions, the particu-
lar statutes involved, and public policies promulgated, one can gain an
understanding about the guiding principles in this area of the law.
1. D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDEs § 3.5 (1973).
2. Interest awards, other than those based upon contract provisions, are awards of simple
interest. Thus, prejudgment and judgment interest is ordinarily not compounded. Hamilton
v. Netherton, 194 Kan. 683, 401 P.2d 657 (1965).
3. Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, , 307 A.2d 571, 575, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106
(1973).
4. See Comment, The Availability of Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury and
Wrongful Death Cases, 16 U.S.F.L. REv. 325, 326-27 (1982).
5. See State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 274 (Alaska 1970) (wrongful death action in which
prejudgment interest was held to accrue from time of death).
6. For a detailed analysis of formulas used to compute the exact amount of interest to be
paid, see Comment, Prejudgment Interest as an Element of Damages: Proposed Solutions
for a Colorado Problem, 49 U. CoLo. L. REv. 335 (1978).
7. Comment, Interest Damages in Virginia, 28 VA. L. REv. 1138, 1141 (1942).
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Through such an analysis, this article discusses the insurer's liability for
prejudgment interest, specifically focusing upon whether and to what ex-
tent an insurer is liable for prejudgment interest when the verdict exceeds
the policy limits. The scope of this analysis deals primarily with automo-
bile liability insurance; however, the principles discussed herein are gen-
erally applicable to other forms of liability insurance as well.
II. THE STANDARD LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY
A. Definition
A liability policy is a contract of insurance which undertakes to pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which he becomes legally obligated to pay
as damages.' Thus, the purpose of automobile liability insurance is to
protect the owner of a motor vehicle against losses arising out of claims
due to injuries to third persons for which he, as owner of the vehicle, is
responsible.9 The coverage afforded an insured, as well as the liability of
an insurer, is determined by the insuring clauses, exceptions, and exclu-
sions contained in the policy.10
Under such a policy the insured is normally required to notify the in-
surer within a reasonable time of any accident which might result in a
claim under the policy. The insured must also cooperate with the insurer
in the defense of any action under the policy, and he is further precluded
from taking any action toward the settlement of a claim on his own. A
failure to comply substantially with any of these requirements will result
in the release of the insurer from liability under the policy.
1
B. The Postjudgment Interest Clause
The standard liability insurance policy contains a postjudgment inter-
est" clause providing that the insurer shall pay "all interest accruing af-
ter entry of judgment until the company has paid or tendered or depos-
ited in court such part of such judgment as does not exceed the limits of
the company's liability thereon."' This contract provision was the first
8. 2 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 9.01 (1981).
9. C. HULVEY & W. WANDEL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE IN VIRGINIA 103 (1930).
10. LONG, supra note 8, at § 9.01.
11. It becomes apparent that the insurance company exercises total control over the pol-
icy and the litigation process. The insured is largely at the mercy of the insurer, and it thus
becomes necessary for the courts to protect the rights of the insured. See Wilkerson v. Ma-
ryland Casualty Co., 119 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Va. 1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1954).
12. Postjudgment interest refers to interest to be paid on a judgment from the time the
judgment is rendered by the court to the time of the payment by the insurance company.
13. Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 983, 987 (1961). "While the annotation concerns liability for in-
terest on judgments, it equally applies where prejudgment interest is concerned." Michigan
Milk Producers Ass'n v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 493 F. Supp. 66, 70 n.5 (W.D. Mich.
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form of judgment interest to be allowed by the courts. 14 The courts were
at one time split as to the exact meaning of this clause; however, there is
now a consensus that this provision requires the insurer to pay interest on
the entire amount of damages until it either pays the amount of its liabil-
ity under the policy limits to the plaintiff or tenders such amount to the
court.15 Thus, an insurer may be obligated to pay postjudgment interest
on a judgment recovered against the insured in excess of the policy limits,
even though the payment of such interest may cause the insurer's total
liability to exceed the limits of the policy.' 6 In United Services Automo-
bile Association v. Russom," the court stated that the payment of inter-
est is by its nature an undertaking to pay a sum over and above the pol-
icy limits, frequently in substantial amounts. The courts have also noted
that since the insurer maintains exclusive direction and control of the de-
fense and settlement of a claim, it seems only fair that he be required to
assume full responsibility for the accrual of any interest necessarily re-
sulting from a delay in payment following the rendering of judgment.18
The court's acceptance of postjudgment interest, as well as the insurer's
liability for interest on an amount exceeding the policy limits, laid the
groundwork for the award of prejudgment interest and the liability of the
insurer for such interest on awards which exceed its policy limits.
III. THE INSURER'S LIABLiTY FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
A. The Liquidated-Unliquidated Debate
Historically, prejudgment interest was allowed only on liquidated
claims.' 9 The original distinction between liquidated and unliquidated'
damages was based on the theory that the defendant should be penalized
for not promptly paying the set amount owed, but it was considered un-
fair to impose a penalty for not paying an obligation of an uncertain
amount.20 The modern rule is to recognize prejudgment interest as an or-
1980).
14. 76 A.L.R.2d at 986.
15. See Security Ins. Co. v. Houser, 191 Colo. 189, 552 P.2d 308 (1976). See also Powell v.
T.A. & C. Taxi, Inc., 104 N.H. 428, 188 A.2d 654 (1963) (automobile liability insurer held
liable for postjudgment interest on full amount of award, even where such award was in
excess of the stated policy limits); McPhee v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 689,
205 N.W.2d 152 (1973) (reasonable to impose the entire expense of accrual of postjudgment
interest upon the insurer in view of company's right to control the litigation process).
16. See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Russom, 241 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1957); Crook v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241 (1960).
17. 241 F.2d at 303. See also LONG, supra note 8, at § 9.01.
18. Wilkerson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 119 F. Supp. 383, 388 (E.D. Va. 1953).
19. A liquidated amount is one which is made certain or fixed by agreement of the parties
or by operation of law. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1141.
20. See Zorn v. Britton, 120 Fla. 304, -, 162 So. 879, 880 (1935) (interest is allowed on
damages to property from date of accrual of cause of action, but is not allowable on unliqui-
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dinary element of compensatory damages present in all cases.2 1 If such
interest is not allowed, the plaintiff will often be less than fully compen-
sated for the actual loss or injury he has suffered.22 The liquidated-unliq-
uidated distinction has taken on considerably less significance in modern
litigation and has been largely repudiated or ignored in many jurisdic-
tions.23 In general, there is now a willingness by courts to allow interest
on unliquidated claims as justice may dictate.24 To the extent that the
liquidated-unliquidated distinction survives today, it must be subordi-
nated to the more fundamental principle that damages in a given case
must give full compensation for the plaintiff's losses.
25
B. Protecting the Rights of the Insurer: A Limited Liability View
There are two schools of thought concerning an insurer's liability for
prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limits. The first school holds
that the insurer's liability for interest is strictly limited by its policy lim-
its clause.26 In Guin v. Ha,27 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a
dated damages for personal injuries).
21. LONG, supra note 8, at § 9.01. This stems from the recognition that money has a use
value. Therefore, while the defendant retains possession of the money which he will eventu-
ally have to pay to the plaintiff, assuming a future judgment against him, the plaintiff is
deprived of the use and earning power of his own money, and should thus be compensated
for the loss. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1142.
22. Interest is allowed as damages from the time when the principal debt became due, or
when the right to damages for the breach of contract or tort first accrued. C. McCoRMIcK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 58 (1935).
23. See Comment, Prejudgment Interest: An Element of Damages Not to be Overlooked,
8 CuM. L. REv. 521, 535 (1977).
24. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 181 (1965).
25. If the plaintiff has been deprived of the use of his property, he should be compensated
for that loss whether the exact sum due him as principal is ascertainable.
The fact remains in both situations the defendant has had the use, and the plaintiff
has not, of moneys which the judgment finds was the damage plaintiff suffered. This
is true whether the contested liability is for a liquidated or for an unliquidated sum.
For that reason, the concept of a "liquidated" sum has often been strained to find a
basis for an award of interest.
Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, -, 307 A.2d 571, 575 (1973). Upon a recognition of the use
value of money and the compensatory nature of interest, the liquidated-unliquidated dis-
tinction breaks down.
26. See Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979). See also Dittus v. Geyman, 68 Mich.
App. 433, 242 N.W.2d 800 (1976) (automobile liability insurer held liable for prejudgment
interest from date of complaint, but only to extent that amount of interest did not exceed
policy limits); Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 106 R.I. 632, 262 A.2d 370 (1970)
(insurer under automobile liability insurance policy was not obligated to pay prejudgment
interest in excess of its policy limits merely because it exercised exclusive control over the
litigation process and thus the running of interest). But see Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 493 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (where automobile liabil-
ity insurer exercised full control over litigation process, he was held liable for prejudgment
interest on full amount of award, including excess of policy limits).
27. 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979).
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medical malpractice liability insurer was liable for prejudgment interest
to the extent that the sum paid by the insurer did not exceed the policy
limits set by the insurer. The court found that under Alaskan law, pre-
judgment interest was properly classified as compensatory damages, and
thus such interest was damages within the meaning of the insurer's liabil-
ity limits clause.28 Thus, the insurer was not obligated to pay interest in
excess of its designated policy limits. It was felt that in order to hold the
insurer liable for prejudgment interest exceeding the policy limits, the
company must have assumed such an obligation in the contract, or public
policy must intervene and impose the obligation despite the terms of the
contract.
29
1. The Insurance Contract 0
"The liability of an insurer and the extent of the loss under a policy of
28. Id. at 1285. The provisions of the insurance policy, insofar as they were relevant to
the issue of prejudgment interest, provided:
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
2. NOW WE THE UNDERWRITERS hereby agree, subject to the terms, limita-
tions, exclusions and conditions of this Insurance, to pay on behalf of the Assured all
sums which the Assured shall by law be held liable to pay for damages arising out of
bodily injury or mental injury to or death of any patient caused by or alleged to have
been caused by error, omission or negligence in professional services rendered or
which should have been rendered (hereinafter referred to as Malpractice)
3. As respects the coverage afforded by this Insurance, the Underwriters will defend
any claim or suit in the name of and on behalf of the Assured and will pay the costs
and expenses incurred in such defence ....
4. Irrespective of the number of persons or entities named as Assured in the Sched-
ule or added by endorsement, the liability of the Underwriters hereunder for damages
shall not exceed the limit of liability set out in the Schedule in respect of any one
patient, nor the limit of liability set out in the Schedule in respect of all claims made
against the Assured during the currency of this Insurance .... except that, subject
to the provisions contained in Paragraph 3, the Underwriters will pay the costs and
expenses incurred in the defence of any claim or suit.
Id.
29. Id. at 1287. "[T]he interpretation of the words of the contract is treated in the same
manner as questions of law." National Bank v. J.B.L. & K., Inc., 546 P.2d 579, 586 (Alaska
1976).
[W]hen the language of an insurance policy admits to two reasonable constructions,
the fault must be charged to the insurer who selected the language, and the language
is interpreted in favor of the insureds. But, in seeking to ascertain the intent of the
parties, (the] insurance policy must be examined in its entirety and the language used
must be given its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.
Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 106 R.I. 632, -, 262 A.2d 370, 372 (1970).
30. The purpose of contract interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the reasonable
expectations of the parties. However, due to the inequality in bargaining power and the
need for certainty in ascertaining rates, somewhat different standards are applied to the
interpretation of insurance contracts. An insurance contract may be considered a contract of
adhesion and thus should be construed to provide the coverage which a lay person would
reasonably have expected. However this approach is not to be used as an instrument for
1983]
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liability or indemnity insurance [311 must be determined, measured and
limited by the terms of the contract. 3 2 By the terms of its contract, the
insurer in Guin agreed to pay the liability of the insured for damages up
to $25,000, to defend the insured, and to pay "costs and expenses in-
curred in such defense. '3 4 The agreement to pay costs and expenses is
considered a standard supplementary payments clause and is not subject
to limitation by the policy.35
The insurer's promise to pay all costs and expenses incurred in the de-
fense of the suit would not, in common understanding, include prejudg-
ment interest.36 Costs include those items that a court is authorized to tax
against the losing party, and Alaska does not include prejudgment inter-
est among the items allowed as costs.37 Nothing in the supplemental pay-
ments clause could be construed as imposing upon the insurer the obliga-
tion to pay prejudgment interest, as such interest is an item of
compensatory damages and is thus limited by the damages clause in the
contract. Thus, when an insurer pays the limits of liability coverage to an
injured third party on behalf of its insured, it discharges its obligation
under the policy.
Alaska's general interest statutes provides that the rate of interest in
the state is eight percent per year on any money after it is due. Under
this statute, money is due when the cause of action accrues. 39 Thus,
Alaska's interest statute imposes on defendants in tort actions the obliga-
tion to pay prejudgment interest computed from the date of the injury.
40
In Guin, the insured argued, based on this statute, that the policy limits
were due from the insurer on the date of injury rather than the date of
settlement. The court disagreed with this contention.41 Pursuant to the
policy, the insurer had agreed to pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the "assured shall by law be held liable to pay for damages." 42 Un-
til a valid judgment was rendered or settlement reached, the insured was
rewriting the contract. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Alaska 1979) (citing Stordahl v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 65-66 (Alaska 1977)).
31. Under a policy of indemnity insurance, the insurer does not become obligated to the
insured until the insured has suffered an actual "out of pocket" loss (actually paid the
award to the plaintiff).
32. 15 G. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 56:1 (2d ed. 1966).
33. 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979).
34. Id. at 1285.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Thus, an analysis of the applicable statutory law is of extreme importance when at-
tempting to ascertain the meaning of an insurance policy.
38. ALAsKA STAT. § 45.45010 (1976).
39. State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 274 (Alaska 1976).
40. Id.




not liable by law to pay damages to the injured party. Thus, the sum that
the insurance company might eventually pay on behalf of the insured was
not due until the time of settlement. In this way, the court held that the
language of the contract itself in no way obligated the insurer to pay pre-
judgment interest in excess of the policy limits.
43
2. Public Policy Considerations
The "limited liability school" fears that holding the insurer liable for
prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limits will put unfair pressure
on the insurer to settle early. It is argued that such excess liability could
force an insurance company to acquiesce to a plaintiff's demands at an
early stage of the proceeding, regardless of any meritorious defenses it
may have. It would do so rather than run the risk of paying a large
amount of interest caused by court delays, should the plaintiff eventually
recover.44 In addition, the insurer is responsible for the costs of defending
the litigation, which increase substantially in the advanced stages of trial
preparation, thus providing added impetus for early acquiescence.
It is also argued that holding insurers liable for prejudgment interest in
excess of the policy limits denies insurers the right to limit their risks
contractually. 45 Aside from altering the insurer's assumed contractual du-
ties, the excess liability injects an unwarranted element of uncertainty
into the area of liability insurance and thus presents considerable
problems in the accurate computation of premiums.
In Guin,4 the court recognized the fact that under liability insurance
policies the insurer maintains exclusive control of the litigation process
and retains the use of, and presumably earns interest on, the funds for
which it will eventually be held liable. However, it held that notions of
economic fairness are not sufficient grounds for restricting the contractual
rights of the insurer.47
Recognizing the possibility that increasing an insurer's liability to in-
clude interest in excess of the policy limits might facilitate the early set-
tlement of claims in cases where liability was clear, the court in Guin
stated that "[e]ncouraging early settlement where liability is clear is a
salutary goal, but it does not require the insurer to bear the burden of
risk it has not assumed.' 48 The court further noted that in every contract
43. Id. at 1291.
44. Comment, supra note 4, at 352-53.
45. See Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 493 F. Supp. 66, 71
(W.D. Mich. 1980).
46. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979).
47. Id. at 1284. For a full discussion of public policy considerations favoring holding the
insurer liable for prejudgment interest beyond the policy limits, see infra text accompanying
notes 60-71.
48. 591 P.2d at 1291.
1983]
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there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which obli-
gates the insurer to act promptly in response to reasonable offers of set-
tlement 49 or to bring the case to trial.
Thus, an insured will not suffer at the hands of an uncooperative insur-
ance company because any undue delay on its part could be seen as a
breach of this implied covenant of good faith.50 The insured is entitled to
recover from his insurer any prejudgment interest attributable to such
bad faith, regardless of the policy limits. 51
Thus, the limited liability school of thought acknowledges the existence
of public policy considerations on either side of the issue but adheres to
the position that no compelling reason exists to hold the insurer liable for
prejudgment interest in excess of its stated policy limits.
C. The Insurer's Liability for Interest in Excess of the Policy Limits: A
Modern Approach
The second school of thought adheres to the view that insurers should
be held liable for prejudgment interest, including an amount which ex-
ceeds the specific policy limits.52 Policy considerations concerning the
very nature and purpose of awarding interest support such a view.
1. Prejudgment Interest Statutes and Their Effect on the Liability In-
surance Policy
Prejudgment interest statutes" vary drastically as to their provisions
49. A thorough discussion of the issue of insurer's duty to make a good faith effort to
settle the claim within the policy limits is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion
of the modern view regarding this issue, see Comment, Insurers' Liability for Excess Judg-
ments in Virginia: Negligence or Bad Faith?, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 153 (1980) (modem trend
is toward holding insurer liable for excess judgment based on mere negligence standard
rather than on requirement of bad faith).
50. 591 P.2d at 1291. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323
A.2d 495 (1974) (in making decision on whether to go to trial, insurer must weigh the con-
flicting interest as if it had full coverage for whatever verdict might be received, regardless
of the policy limits). For a discussion concerning the bad faith issue see Koesterer, Liability
in Excess of Policy Limits, 1977 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 287.
51. Note that if the courts recognize and follow the modern trend of holding the insurer
liable for excess judgments based on a negligence standard, this would have important ef-
fects on the insurer's liability for prejudgment interest. A lowering of the good faith stan-
dard would necessarily mean a concomitant increase in the insurer's liability for prejudg-
ment interest, resulting in increased premiums to spread this additional expense.
52. The following states apparently follow this school: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illi-
nois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin (Ohio and Pennsylvania have deci-
sions holding each way). Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 493
F. Supp. 66, 70 n.7 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
53. There are a number of states that provide for the payment of prejudgment interest by
statute. Such states include Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York,
[Vol. 17:617
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for the awarding of prejudgment interest; however, all have a decided im-
pact on the nature and extent of the insurer's liability. The basic aim of
such statutes is to insure that the plaintiff is fully compensated for his
injuries by awarding him the "use value" of the money to which he was
entitled, and at the same time, to alleviate delay in the disposition of
cases, thereby lessening congestion in the courts by providing an incen-
tive for the early settlement of claims.54
In Michigan, prejudgment interest is awarded under section 6013 of the
Revised Judicature Act.5 This section of the act requires the addition of
prejudgment interest to all judgments in civil actions unless there has
been a bona fide offer of settlement by the losing party which is as large
as or larger than the amount ultimately awarded.56 The statute does not
specifically mention insurers; however, if the statute is to accomplish its
purpose, the insurer must be held liable for prejudgment interest in ex-
cess of its policy limits. 57 If the insurer is insulated from liability beyond
its policy limits, he will have far less incentive to seek early settlements of
claims approaching or exceeding policy limits than he would were he cog-
North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, -, 307 A.2d 571,
576 (1973).
54. See Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981), appeal dismissed,
- U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2002 (1982); Comment, Denham v. Bedford: Statutory Prejudgment
Interest and Its Effect on Third Party Insurers, 1979 DEr. C.L. REv. 345, 347.
55. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6013 (Supp. 1982-1983). By enacting this statute, Mich-
igan has adopted the theory that all civil judgments become due at the time plaintiff files
his complaint, rather than at the time of judgment. This statute is in line with the abandon-
ment of the liquidated-unliquidated distinction because the defendant is liable for interest
on the total amount of the judgment, even though he may have no way of knowing in ad-
vance what that amount will be.
56. The text of this statute is as follows:
If a bona fide written offer of settlement in a civil action based on tort is made by
the party against whom the judgment is subsequently rendered and the offer of set-
tlement is substantially identical or substantially more favorable to the prevailing
party than the judgment, the court may order that interest shall not be allowed be-
yond the date the written offer of settlement is made.
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6013(5) (Supp. 1982-1983). The author feels that mandatory
prejudgment interest statutes should include such a protective clause relieving defendant of
the interest obligation when plaintiff unreasonably refuses a bona fide settlement offer.
57. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently noted,
The judicial system has long been vexed by the problem of congestion and delay in
the disposition of civil actions for bodily injury, death or property damages pending
in the trial courts....
[B]ut in too many cases meaningful negotiations commence only after a trial date is
fixed or on the courthouse steps or in the courtroom, thus leading to delay in the
disposition of cases and congestion in the courts.
Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 496 Pa. 52, -, 436 A.2d 147, 150-51 (1981) (quoting Civil
Procedure Rules Committee, Proposed Rule 238 Comment, reprinted in 8 PA. BULL. 2668
(1978)), appeal dismissed, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2002 (1982). Tort litigation places a major
demand upon the judicial system, and it is a generally accepted principle that most tort
judgments are covered by liability insurance. Comment, supra note 4, at 352.
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nizant of the fact that his liability for prejudgment interest would not be
limited by his policy limits. Secure in the belief that his liability is lim-
ited by his policy limits, the insurer may cause undue delay in an attempt
to wear the plaintiff down. In Denham v. Bedford,58 the Michigan Court
of Appeals recognized the existence of this problem and held that public
policy dictated that the prejudgment interest statute be incorporated into
the insurance policy. The policy had contained the standard postjudg-
ment interest clause, but had made no mention of prejudgment interest.
The court held that the existence of the statute, and the public policy
considerations inherent in it, mandated that the postjudgment interest
clause be modified to provide for the calculating of interest from the filing
of the complaint. The court then held the insurer liable for prejudgment
interest on its portion of the judgment, even where the inclusion of such
interest required the insurer to pay an amount in excess of its policy lim-
its." Thus, due to the existence of the Michigan prejudgment interest
statute, the insurer was held liable for prejudgment interest in an amount
exceeding its policy limits despite the absence of such an explicit agree-
ment in the insurance policy.
2. Public Policy Considerations
In Busik v. Levine,60 the New Jersey Supreme Court viewed its pre-
judgment interest rule as an attempt to induce prompt defense considera-
tion of settlement possibilities,6 1 demonstrating that the award of pre-
judgment interest bears directly upon the judicial machinery and the
policies of judicial management.6 2 As recognized by the Michigan court in
Denham,6 3 effective enforcement of such a rule and the policy considera-
tions behind it require holding the insurer liable for prejudgment interest
in an amount which exceeds the policy limits. In Denham, the court
58. 82 Mich. App. 107, 266 N.W.2d 682 (1978), aff'd, 407 Mich. 517, 287 N.W.2d 168
(1980).
59. Id. at -, 266 N.W.2d at 685. The court based its holding on an earlier decision,
Cosby v. Pool, 36 Mich. App. 571, 194 N.W.2d 142 (1971), which held that an insurance
contract made prior to enactment of the prejudgment interest statute was effectively
amended by the statute and required payment of interest from the date of the filing of the
complaint, not merely from the date of judgment as the actual contract provided. The court
discussed the constitutionality of altering an insurance contract in such a manner and deter-
mined that the statute did not change the substance of the contractual duties and obliga-
tions and applied it retroactively. Id. at -, 194 N.W.2d at 145. See Ballog v. Knight News-
papers, Inc., 381 Mich. 527, 164 N.W.2d 19 (1969).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey approved retroactive application of a prejudgment
interest statute in cases where the accident involved occured before the rule was adopted,
but the cases come to trial after the effective date of the rule. Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351,
307 A.2d 571 (1973).
60. 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973).
61. Id. at -, 307 A.2d at 575.
62. Id. at -, 307 A.2d at 576.




For us to hold otherwise, an insurer would have no motivation to settle a
meritorious claim. By refusing to settle, the insurer not only has a chance to
wear a plaintiff down, thereby possibly settling a meritorious claim for less
than its actual value, but it also knows that even if plaintiff is successful in
litigation, it [the insurance company] will still be able to retain all the in-
come made from the use of a plaintiff's money. Such a policy is contrary to
the sound administration of the judicial system and repugnant to the public
policy behind the insurance laws of this state.64
In holding an insurer liable for prejudgment interest on the amount of
its policy limits, even where payment of such interest would force the
insurer's total liability beyond its stated policy limits, the insurer is only
paying that which it presumably earned by holding the money. Thus, it is
both just and rational to hold the insurer liable to the plaintiff for such
an amount. Accordingly, the majority of jurisdictions have resolved that
the insurer is liable for all prejudgment interest on its policy limits, even
where the payment of such interest forces the insurer's total liability be-
yond its stated policy limits.65
In Michigan Milk Producers Association v. Commercial Union Insur-
ance Co.,66 it was stated that,
The only issue . . . which remains unresolved at common law is not
whether an insurer is liable for interest on the policy limits but whether the
insurer is liable for interest on the whole judgment. The courts have split on
this issue although the majority and modern trend is in favor of holding the
insurers liable for interest on the whole judgment.87
It is argued that insurers should be held liable for prejudgment interest
on the entire judgment rather than merely on their policy limits because
they exercise full control over the entire litigation process.68 By the very
terms of the insurance policy, the liability insurer retains full control over
any investigation process, settlement, or litigation. The insured has no
control over the process; and if he attempts to settle of his own volition,
he runs the risk of forfeiture of any rights under the policy. It hardly
seems fair to allow the insurance company to litigate the entire case in an
effort to save its policy coverage and then force the insured to pay the
prejudgment interest on the excess verdict when he exercised no control
over the litigation process. The insurer is in a position to control the liti-
gation process and is better able to absorb the costs of delay by spreading
the expenses over a large number of policy holders. Thus, the equities
64. Id. at -, 266 N.W.2d at 686.
65. Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 493 F. Supp. 66, 71
(W.D. Mich. 1980).
66. Id. at 66.
67. Id. at 70 (citing Denham v. Bedford, 407 Mich. 517, 533, 287 N.W.2d 168, 173 (1980)).
68. 493 F. Supp. at 71.
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would seem to weigh in favor of the insurer being held liable for the full
amount of prejudgment interest.
An additional rationale for requiring an insurer to pay prejudgment in-
terest in excess of the policy limits can be found in the terms of the con-
tract itself. In Michigan Milk Producers Association,69 the insurance pol-
icy contained a standard postjudgment interest clause that had been
included within a supplementary payments provision.7 0 Payments speci-
fied in the supplementary payments section of an insurance policy are
supplementary in so far as they are in addition to the damages payment
to which the policy limits refer. Thus, the agreement to pay interest was
by its nature an agreement to pay an amount beyond the policy limits.
The court held that the postjudgment interest clause was modified by the
Michigan prejudgment interest statute to include the payment of interest
from the time of the filing of the complaint. The insurer was then held
liable for prejudgment interest on the full amount of the judgment.
71
Thus, due to the Michigan interest statute and the policy considerations
inherent in it and the terms of the insurance contract itself, the insurer
became liable for interest on the entire judgment.
IV. INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN VIRGINIA: A
POSSIBLE STANCE
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not yet dealt directly with the issue
of an insurer's liability for prejudgment interest. However, an analysis of
the Virginia decisions regarding postjudgment interest, coupled with a
careful reading of the Virginia statute providing for the payment of inter-
est on judgments,7 2 yields a sound basis for a rational prediction of Vir-
ginia's position on the issue.
In analyzing the state of the law regarding the payment of prejudgment
interest in Virginia, one author noted:
Here is only a trifling subdivision of the small segment of the law, but even
here many difficulties have arisen. The efforts of the legislature to clarify
the uncertainties have not been entirely effective, and a review of judicial
decisions on the point leaves several questions unanswered. The fact that
69. Id.
70. The supplemental payments provision of the contract obligated the insurer to defend
the insured against any suit seeking damages payable under the policy and to pay in addi-
tion to the applicable limits of liability
all costs taxed against the insured in any such suit or arbitration proceeding and all
interest on the entire amount of any judgment and before the company has paid or
tendered or deposited in court that amount of the judgment which does not exceed
the limits of the company's liability thereon.
Id. at 67.
71. Id. at 69.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-382 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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the issue has been passed on in only a relatively few cases (compared with
the innumerable adjudications in which a claim for interest might have been
made and disputed) fosters the suspicion that counsel may have often shied
away from a precarious path which might have led to a substantial benefit
for a client.
7 3
Virginia provides for the allowance of prejudgment interest by stat-
ute.7 4 The statute is purely discretionary, clothing the judge or jury with
the power to provide for interest on the full award or only a part thereof
and to fix the period from which the interest will run. The interest is
deemed to run until the judgment is paid. The statute further provides
that if the judge or jury does not provide for interest, the award shall
bear interest from the time the judgment was entered, thereby making
the payment of postjudgment interest mandatory.75
The existence of the statute serves to support the proposition that the
Virginia legislature, and thus the desires of the public, support the award
of prejudgment interest in Virginia. The statute applies to all actions and
suits, and the jury is given broad discretion both as to the allowance of
the interest and to the fixing of the date at which it shall commence.
There is nothing in the statute to indicate that interest is not to be
awarded on unliquidated claims. "The fact that the provisions of the stat-
ute are to be applied in a tort action, which is usually an unliquidated
claim, clearly indicates a legislative intent that an unliquidated claim is
within its purview."76 The purpose of the statute is to allow for the full
compensation of a plaintiff by awarding him the "use value" of money.
77
The statute is discretionary, thus allowing for the award of interest where
the equities so dictate and the denial of it where they do not. Thus, in a
case where the plaintiff unreasonably refuses a good faith offer by the
73. Comment, supra note 7, at 1138-39.
74. The text of the statute is as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in § 8.3-122, in any action at law or suit in equity, the
verdict of the jury, or if no jury the judgment or decree of the court, may provide for
interest on any principal sum awarded, or any part thereof, and fix the period at
which the interest shall commence. The judgment or decree entered shall provide for
such interest until such principal sum be paid. If a judgment or decree be rendered
which does not provide for interest, the judgment or decree awarded shall bear inter-
est from its date of entry, at the rate so provided in § 6.1-330.10, and judgment or
decree entered accordingly; provided, if the judgment entered in accordance with the
verdict of a jury does not provide for interest, interest shall commence from the date
that the verdict was rendered.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-382 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
75. The statute thus provides for the payment of both prejudgment and postjudgment
interest.
76. Beale v. King, 204 Va. 443, 448, 132 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1963). Section 8.01-382 of the
Virginia Code which now applies to all actions and suits, expanded the section to which the
court refers in Beale, which was limited to actions in contract or tort and suits in equity. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-382 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
77. City of Danville v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 34 F. Supp. 620, 638-39 (W.D. Va. 1940).
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insurer, the jury may refuse to award interest or may award only partial
interest as justice dictates.
The federal decisions applying this statute have continually adhered to
the view that the insurer is liable for the payment of interest even though
such payment makes the total amount due exceed the stated policy lim-
its.78 In American Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fulcher,79 the court found
it clear "that the liability stipulated in the policy is a contractual one
relating solely to the risks insured against, and that it in no way affects
the payment of interest on the judgment, which is a liability imposed by
law."80 Thus, the payment of interest is not to be limited by the terms of
the insurance policy.
In Wilkerson v. Maryland Casualty Co.,81 the court recognized that the
insurer controls the entire litigation process and that the policy holder is
powerless to effect a settlement of his own volition. The court stated:
Not infrequently judgment is obtained against an insured for an amount in
excess of the coverage of the policy and it would seem a harsh rule to permit
the insurer to litigate the entire case in an effort to save the amount of its
coverage while interest on the excess accumulates against the insured....
With the company in control of the conduct of the case the policy holder is
powerless should he desire to effect a settlement unless the company
consents.
8 2
While this rationale was employed in holding the insurer liable for
postjudgment interest in excess of its policy limits, the same rationale has
been used by other courts to hold the insurer liable for prejudgment in-
terest beyond its policy limits.
8 3
The provision for the award of interest on unliquidated claims in Vir-
ginia as early as 184984 reflects a longstanding permissive attitude towards
the awarding of interest as damages. In recognition of this attitude and
the public policy of providing for full and fair compensation to plaintiffs
and protecting the interests of the insured, 5 as well as the federal deci-
sions applying the Virginia interest statutes in holding the insurer liable
78. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fulcher, 201 F.2d 751, 757 (4th Cir. 1953) (insurer held




81. 119 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Va. 1953), afl'd, 210 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1954) (automobile
liability insurer held liable for full amount of postjudgment interest even where such
amount exceeded the stated policy limits).
82. Id. at 388.
83. See Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 493 F. Supp. 66
(W.D. Mich. 1980); Denham v. Bedford, 82 Mich. App. 107, 266 N.W.2d 682 (1978), aff'd,
407 Mich. 517, 287 N.W.2d 168 (1980).
84. Comment, supra note 7, at 1149.
85. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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for postjudgment interest in excess of the predetermined policy limits, 6
one can reasonably predict that if faced with the issue today, Virginia
would follow the apparent modern trend and hold the insurer liable for
prejudgment interest in an amount exceeding the policy limits, including
possibly the amount of the entire judgment as well.
8 7
V. CONCLUSION
It is often necessary to award prejudgment interest to achieve full and
just compensation for an injured plaintiff due to the delay in payment of
funds owed him as a result of injuries inflicted by the defendant. Both
the ultimate liability for the payment of such interest and the extent of it
are extremely important to both the liability insurer and the insured.
Whether the insurer is liable for prejudgment interest in excess of the
policy limits is a function of the particular policy's language, the existing
case and statutory law in a given jurisdiction, and the weight which the
court chooses to attach to competing policy considerations.
In numerous jurisdictions the postjudgment interest clause has been
used as a vehicle for the expansion of the liability of the insurer for pre-
judgment interest. Whether done through a particular statute, or based
purely on analogy to precedent, or on reasons of public policy, or a combi-
nation of these, the courts have evidenced an increased willingness to
hold the insurer liable for prejudgment interest. To the extent that a
modern trend exists, it would appear to be in favor of increasing the in-
surer's liability for prejudgment interest to include the payment of inter-
est on the full award in situations where the verdict exceeds the policy
limits.
David J. Pierce
86. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
87. While in some cases a request for interest might be refused, it should nonetheless be
requested in all cases. The plaintiff takes no risk in asking for an instruction informing the
jury that they may give interest on the verdict, for such a request is not likely to result in a
lower award. On the otherhand, it is virtually certain that the jury will award interest in at
least some cases. It is also likely that while a jury might not award interest, it will take such
a request into consideration when considering the amount to be awarded and thereby be
influenced to render a higher award. The legislature considered prejudgment interest impor-
tant enough to provide for it by statute. Plaintiff's attorneys should be aware of their cli-
ent's entitlement to prejudgment interest under the statute and make a timely request for
its award.
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